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IS STARE DECISIS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION?: 
EXPLORING THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
POSSIBILITIES 
James Cleith Phillips* 
For some time, a scholarly debate has raged over whether a 
commitment to the original meaning of the Constitution allows for the 
doctrine of stare decisis, whereby courts defer to precedent simply because 
it is precedent.  This Essay explains the range of theoretical possibilities for 
this seemingly incompatible duo, as put forth by originalism’s leading 
scholars, and situates these various theories on a continuum.  The Essay 
ends with a preview of the difficulties and possibilities that follow from the 
various empirical answers regarding the relationship between stare decisis 
and the Constitution at the Founding. 
I.     THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES 
At one end of the theoretical spectrum is the position of strong stare 
decisis—it always trumps constitutional meaning.  This view of the 
perpetual supremacy of stare decisis is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
it reads three words in the Constitution—“[t]he judicial Power”1—as 
relegating the rest of the text to second-class status.  This view further 
means that originalism, or any theory of constitutional interpretation, is 
only relevant when a court is dealing with a constitutional matter of first 
impression.  It thus reduces originalism to a theory of stare decisis almost 
all of the time.  Second, under what I call the Plessy test—whether a theory 
of stare decisis would mean Plessy v. Ferguson2 would still be good law—
this view fails.  While it is possible that the judicial-power tail is designed 
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 *  Clerk, Utah Supreme Court; Ph.D. candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, 
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 1  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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to wag the constitutional dog, it does seem odd.  Though possible, why 
would the Constitution elevate the Supreme Court above itself?  How, 
under that scenario, could the judiciary be the least dangerous branch, or 
could we even have a republic? 
The polar opposite position is one where stare decisis is irrelevant as 
to the meaning of the Constitution.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Gary Lawson, 
and to a lesser extent, Akhil Amar and Randy Barnett, make arguments 
along these lines.3  Paulsen contends that stare decisis is incompatible with 
any interpretive theory because it ultimately corrupts the theory.4  For 
instance, if one ascribes to originalism—that the meaning of the 
Constitution is what the words originally meant when enacted—then stare 
decisis is incompatible and following precedent when it is not the original 
meaning rejects the premise of originalism.5 
Lawson argues that the logic of judicial review, inherent in the judicial 
power, rejects stare decisis.6  This is because it is the duty, not just the 
 
 3  Steven Calabresi “defend[s] the textualism of Amar, Lawson, and Paulsen” by 
“lay[ing] out an argument as to why the Supreme Court ought often to follow the text of the 
Constitution, as originally understood, rather than its own precedents.”  Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 
637 (2006).  It is not clear, though, that what Calabresi argues for is the same as what at 
least Lawson (originally) and Paulsen have argued for. 
 4  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting].  Similar 
to Lawson’s original view, Paulsen argues that:  
[Stare decisis] would have judges apply, in preference to the Constitution, that 
which is not consistent with the Constitution.  That violates the premise on which 
judicial review rests, as set forth in Marbury.  If one accepts the argument for 
judicial review in Marbury as being grounded, correctly, in the supremacy of the 
Constitution (correctly interpreted) over anything inconsistent with it, and as 
binding the judiciary to enforce and apply the Constitution (correctly interpreted) 
in preference to anything inconsistent with it, then courts must apply the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution, never a precedent inconsistent with the correct 
interpretation.  It follows, then, that if Marbury is right (and it is), stare decisis is 
unconstitutional. 
Id.; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2706, 2731–34 (2003). 
 5  Paulsen also argues that stare decisis in constitutional matters is a judge-made 
doctrine not required by the Constitution itself.  To prove this, though, he relies on Supreme 
Court cases stating such.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: 
May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 
1537 n.1 (2000) (collecting cases).  This is an odd move for an originalist to make, 
especially when he is arguing stare decisis is unconstitutional. 
 6  Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL. 23 (1994) [hereinafter Lawson, Constitutional Case].  Lawson moderated his view 
slightly in a later article, arguing that “[a]fter considering the issue further, and digesting a 
decade and a half of criticism of my argument by the legal academy, I want to change my 
conclusion . . . from ‘never’ to ‘mostly never.’”  Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: 
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power, of a court to say what the law is, and in so doing courts must choose 
between conflicting laws of differing hierarchical authority, and must 
independently do so.  Thus, if the President claims his actions are 
constitutional, or Congress alleges its laws are constitutional, a court has an 
independent responsibility to conduct its own analysis and announce legal 
conclusions—judicial review does not allow a court to defer its 
responsibilities.  Its duty is to follow the Supremacy Clause and strike 
down any lesser law that clashes with the Constitution, and precedent is a 
lesser law.  There is therefore no room for a court to delegate its 
responsibilities to a previous court and to allow a court decision to trump 
the Constitution itself.7  And while Lawson acknowledges there is some 
indeterminacy in constitutional meaning, whenever the meaning is 
determinable that meaning should trump what previous courts have said.8 
Lawson acknowledges that one can “plausibly argue” that “when the 
Constitution authorized judges to decide cases, it must also be taken to 
have authorized them to use the tools traditionally employed by judges in 
that endeavor, including the attribution of legal effect to prior decisions” 
since “[t]he Constitution’s framers . . . were well aware of the established 
British practice of treating precedent as a source of law—a practice that 
extended to the interpretation of written texts, such as statutes.”9  While 
calling such an argument “tempting,” he states “it sidesteps rather than 
rebuts the prima facie case against precedent” because “‘[t]he judicial 
Power’ is fundamentally the case-deciding power” and this requires 
adhering to “the sources of law that courts should employ when deciding 
cases and the hierarchical order of those sources in the event of a conflict 
among them.”10  Thus, the Supremacy Clause requires the Constitution to 
trump precedent since it is lower on the totem pole of law, and the Clause 
essentially limits the exercise of the judicial power and what traditional 
judicial tools can be incorporated when interpreting the Constitution.11 
 
The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (footnote 
omitted).  His new, narrow exception is that “the Constitution only permits the use of 
precedent in constitutional cases . . . [if] the precedent is the best available evidence of the 
right answer to constitutional questions.”  Id. at 4. 
 7  I think this may be an inaccurate characterization of what is occurring—a current 
court is pitting its interpretation of the Constitution against a previous court’s interpretation, 
not pitting the Constitution’s text against a previous court’s interpretation.  That is a 
different question of supremacy. 
 8  See Lawson, Constitutional Case, supra note 6, at 31. 
 9  Id. at 29. 
 10  Id. 
 11  There is a possible problem with this argument.  Statutes were known to trump 
court decisions prior to the Constitution, which would have made stare decisis a nullity in 
statutory interpretation, limiting it only to the common law, but that doesn’t appear to have 
been the case. 
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Amar takes a slightly different tack that is not necessarily inconsistent 
with Paulsen and Lawson’s positions since they confine their arguments to 
stare decisis and original meaning.  Amar conceives of what I think of as 
uppercase Stare Decisis and lowercase stare decisis,12 and appears to be 
tapping into Keith Whittington’s conceptions of constitutional construction 
and interpretation.13  In the scenario of uppercase Stare Decisis—where it 
is dealing with the meaning of the Constitution—the text trumps precedent 
and stare decisis is inappropriate.  In the scenario of lowercase stare 
decisis, where courts are dealing with tests or doctrines that allow for the 
application of the Constitution, stare decisis is very much an appropriate 
and necessary tool of the judiciary.14 
Barnett, like Paulsen, Lawson, and Amar, argues that original meaning 
takes precedence over precedent, and that “permitting original meaning to 
trump precedent is not nearly so radical as it sounds.”15  Barnett notes the 
potential problem with rejecting stare decisis: “[It] seems important to the 
rule of law . . . [as] the stability of constitutional law might be undermined 
as each Court considers itself completely free to reach different conclusions 
about the meaning of the text as time goes by.”16  Yet, as Barnett notes, 
“[n]o one thinks that precedents should last forever.  Everyone thinks that 
some precedent should be rejected.”17  In fact, “many nonoriginalists who 
now invoke precedent to browbeat originalism themselves appear 
committed only to the precedents they happen to like, and this is hardly a 
commitment to the doctrine of precedent at all.”18  Thus, for Barnett: 
The normative case for originalism is based, in large measure, on the 
superiority of the enacted text over the opinions of the branches of 
government that it is supposed to govern and limit—including the 
Supreme Court.  An originalist simply could not accept that the 
Supreme Court could change the meaning of the text from what it meant 
as enacted and still remain an originalist.19 
 
 12  See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 78–89 (2000).  
 13  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 195–212 (1999); 
see also generally KEITH E. WITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (2d prtg. 2001). 
 14  See also Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of 
Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729 (adopting a position similar to Barnett’s, 
and to a lesser degree Amar’s, that allows for precedent that relies on originalism to reach 
its conclusions, as well as precedent that constructs the doctrinal meaning of constitutional 
provisions). 
 15  Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as 
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 263 (2005). 
 16  Id. at 259. 
 17  Id. at 261.  
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 262–63. 
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The reason this proposition in not so radical in Barnett’s view is that 
the clash of stare decisis and the original meaning of the Constitution will 
not happen frequently.  First, he observes, only about a fifth of the Supreme 
Court’s cases deal with the Constitution, and hence “the doctrine of 
precedent could survive for any or all cases whose outcome does not 
concern the original meaning of the text.”20  Second, in the constitutional 
cases, sometimes “the original meaning is rather abstract, or at a higher 
level of generality . . . . The Due Process Clause [is an example].”21  
Because of this, and like Amar, Barnett argues that “an original meaning 
originalist can take the abstract meaning as given, and accept that the 
application of this vague meaning to particular cases is left to future actors, 
including judges, to decide”—via “constitutional construction”—“[t]he 
process of applying general abstract provisions to the facts of particular 
cases by adopting intermediate doctrines.”22  Though even there not all 
precedent is created equal, and the principle Barnett proposes is that 
“judicial constructions of the Constitution that are not inconsistent with 
original meaning may well be subject to the doctrine of precedent.”23  For 
instance, for Barnett “content neutrality,” despite being a “judicially-
created doctrine” that “is by no means a product of the original meaning of 
the First Amendment, [is] a constitutional construction by which the 
original meaning of the First Amendment can be applied in concrete 
cases.”24  Hence, once this doctrine “is adopted, there is no originalist 
objection to it being considered a binding precedent, even if someone 
proposes a different way to implement the right of freedom of speech.”25  
However, such an intermediate doctrine can be properly rejected once 
another is proposed that is either “better . . . in implementing the original 
meaning of the text,”26 or, if equally good on those grounds, better 
“enhance[s] the legitimacy of the Constitution.”27 
In dealing with the concern about reliance interests, Barnett argues 
that “[a]n originalist need not reject legal claims made by particular persons 
made in reliance on mistaken precedent.”28  Thus, for example, if the 
Social Security Act is held unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution’s original meaning, “the government might still be 
obligated to make good on its promises to those who have relied to their 
 
 20  Id. at 263.  But why isn’t Barnett’s logic equally extended to statutory 
interpretation, since statutes are written laws that are inferior only to the Constitution? 
 21  Id. at 263–64. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. at 265 (emphasis omitted). 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. at 264. 
 27  Id. at 265. 
 28  Id. at 266. 
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detriment upon them.”29  Barnett would limit this to “properly tailored 
reliance claims by individual citizens,” and reject reliance claims of 
“governmental actors or interest groups on the continued existence of 
unconstitutional powers or institutions,” arguing that reliance interests are 
“usually applied much too broadly to cases where people have ‘relied’ in 
much too inchoate a sense.”30 
Barnett further agrees with Amar that “precedent can play an 
‘epistemic’ role” by applying a “presumption of correctness” to past 
precedent that saddles a new judge with a burden of proof to overcome.31  
However, Barnett would only extend “any epistemic ‘presumption of 
correctness’” to “previous decisions that actually attempted to discern 
original meaning.”32  Barnett also appears to adopt Caleb Nelson’s 
arguments (detailed later) that early precedent and practices can fix the 
original meaning of ambiguous clauses of the Constitution such that later 
decisions should not be able to overturn them.33  But Barnett would limit 
this to constitutional terms that are ambiguous—“historically 
irresolvable”—not just those that are vague.34 
There are two potential problems with a view that completely rejects 
stare decisis, at least when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution.  
First, it creates the potential, especially on a closely divided court, for 
frequent doctrinal whiplash as the court’s personnel or views change, 
leading to instability that undermines the rule of law, reducing legitimacy 
of the court and possibly also the Constitution, and trampling on reliance 
interests.  And this is also a position of hubris for a court that overlooks the 
fallibility of courts—at least it weights the fallibility differently by 
emphasizing a past court’s fallibility while deemphasizing its own, and 
arguably does little to restrain current courts.  But these prudential 
concerns—if not a part of the text, logic, and structure of the 
Constitution—are ones that originalism would seemingly not 
countenance.35  After all, reliance interests, for example, are policy 
 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 267 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (2000)). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 268. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Paulsen observes that “[s]ome notable would-be originalists accept stare decisis as 
a limitation on, or qualification of, their originalist interpretive premises, without 
recognizing that such acceptance fundamentally undermines their entire interpretive 
justification.”  Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting, supra note 4, at 289 n.2 (first citing 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155–
59 (1990); then citing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 138–40 (1997) (“The whole function of the doctrine is to make us say that 
what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of 
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concerns.  If an originalist will not allow other policy concerns to trump the 
original meaning of the text, why should this policy concern be treated any 
differently if it was not incorporated into the adopted constitutional text?  
Second, it may be that stare decisis vis-à-vis the meaning of the 
Constitution’s text was, as an original matter, incorporated in “[t]he judicial 
Power” and a view completely rejecting stare decisis is simply not correct 
on originalist grounds. 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue in direct response to the 
arguments of Lawson that the “no-precedent position is unconstitutional.”36  
Instead, they contend that “the Constitution’s original meaning embraces at 
least some precedent,”37 what they call “a very narrow” or “minimal 
concept of precedent,” one that “is actually slightly weaker than the 
weakest one that was followed historically.”38  Given the ambiguity of the 
term “judicial Power,” they see it as being plausibly interpreted “to include 
certain traditional aspects of the judicial office that were widely and 
consistently exercised” since “[s]uch core aspects of an office often come 
to be identified with the power that the officer exercises.”39  While they 
note that “the fact that judges deployed a legal concept at the time of the 
Framing does not necessarily make it a requisite element of Article III’s 
judicial power,” they differentiate “[w]idely followed precedent rules” 
from “particular common law rules,” positing that “giving weight to a 
series of precedents would have been seen as an aspect of judging, not 
simply as one of a multitude of rules judges happened to apply.”40 
McGinnis and Rappaport further see the “Supremacy Clause and a 
vibrant precedent doctrine [as] coexist[ing] under the Constitution.”41  This 
is because of the Supremacy Clause’s ambiguity, and “[u]nder [a] narrower 
 
stability.  It is a compromise of all philosophies of interpretation . . . . [S]tare decisis is not 
part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”)).  But see Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1480–
81 (2007) (arguing that a “principled popular sovereignty-based originalist” would see that 
“current enforcement of original meaning is not always necessary and, in fact, on occasion 
may not be advisable” due to concerns about “constitutional legitimacy” and “the rule of 
law”). 
 36  JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 169 (2013).  
 37  Id. at 169. 
 38  Id. at 168–69; see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2349 (2015) (arguing that originalism is inclusive in that it allows precedent if 
justifiable under originalist analysis). 
 39  MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 36, at 168; see also Stephen E. Sachs, 
Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1863–66 (2012) (“Stare decisis 
might simply be a recognized common law doctrine . . . [that was] in effect at the time of the 
Founding . . . .”). 
 40  MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 36, at 169. 
 41  Id. at 173. 
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meaning, the Supremacy Clause would tell the courts to follow the 
Constitution’s original meaning, but to do so in the way that courts 
traditionally apply the law—by applying the governing law in accordance 
with applicable precedent doctrine.”42  They further point out that “given 
this tradition of precedent, an instruction to the courts to ignore precedent 
would seem odd, and therefore Framing era interpreters might require a 
clear statement to that effect before concluding the Constitution required 
it,” and “the Supremacy Clause does not contain such a clear statement.”43 
Further, they note that “the practice of applying precedent to statutory 
interpretations is extremely instructive as to how supreme law was 
understood to be applied by courts.”44  Because “[t]he history of precedent 
shows that judicial decisions interpreting statutes were given effect as 
precedents,” despite statutes “hav[ing] been regarded as supreme law,” this 
supports “[a] narrower interpretation of the Supremacy Clause: that the 
clause instructs the courts to follow supreme law in the manner that courts 
traditionally apply law—by taking into account applicable precedent 
rules.”45  This rests on the assumption that interpreting the supreme law of 
statutes and interpreting the supreme law of a constitution are differences 
only in degree and not in kind vis-à-vis precedent and judicial power.  One 
could make a good argument they are just a matter of degrees, but also a 
good argument that, since the legislature can much more easily overturn 
precedent they disagree with than the sovereign people can amend the 
Constitution (and maybe the Constitution was not meant to be amended as 
often as the legislature overturns or revises its laws), the two types of 
supreme law are more different in kind. 
McGinnis and Rappaport also contend that there are “significant 
differences between following supreme law and following precedent.”46  
They note that usually “treating something as supreme law involves 
following one body of law rather than another,” but “nonoriginalist 
precedent does not involve a body of law in the ordinary sense.”47  Thus, 
the “Constitution does not authorize courts to issue nonoriginalist 
precedents,” but rather “precedent is the way that the courts deal with 
mistaken decisions that have previously been made.”48  In short, 
“[a]llowing precedent law does not involve making precedents supreme 
law, but instead is orthogonal to the normal situation of making something 
supreme law.”49  Whatever its technical accuracy, this argument does not 
 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. at 173–74. 
 46  Id. at 174. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
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make a lot of sense practically.  In a system of stare decisis where 
precedent actually means anything, precedent will trump the original 
meaning of the Constitution in at least some situations, even if a decision of 
the Supreme Court is not actually supreme law in the same sense as the 
Constitution. 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s general argument still does not seem to get 
past the problem that the Constitution arguably contains the seeds of its 
own irrelevance—as precedent piles on precedent, even if it is flatly 
contradictory to the original meaning of the text, it will eventually carry the 
day.  Unless what is embedded in the Constitution is a “minimal precedent 
concept requir[ing] only that some weight be given” to “a series of 
decisions.”50 
The middle ground between the poles of complete rejection or 
complete dominance of precedent would allow for stare decisis to play at 
least some role in fixing the meaning of the Constitution, but not an 
unfettered one.  These middle views can be placed on the same continuum.  
The first, closer to the view rejecting stare decisis, only allows it as a 
tiebreaker.  When the meaning of the Constitution is ambiguous to the 
point that one cannot say one is more likely than the other, then the settled 
meaning from precedent wins.  After all, a decision has to be made since 
the law, like baseball, does not allow ties.  Randy Kozel makes such an 
argument for “consider[ing] the role of judicial precedent not when it 
conflicts with the Constitution’s original meaning but rather when the 
consultation of text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a 
case.”51  Thus, “[i]n those situations, deference to precedent can serve as a 
fallback rule of constitutional adjudication.”52 
The question then becomes: what is a tie?  Should it be conceived like 
in public polling wherein fifty-one to forty-nine is essentially a tie if the 
margin of error is two percent, but not a tie if it is one-half percent?  The 
possible problem with that is we generally cannot ascribe such precision to 
legal ambiguity.  Or one could possibly inject some standard or level of 
burden such that we treat dueling meanings as sufficiently equal, and thus 
let stare decisis be a tiebreaker unless the new meaning is seen as the 
correct interpretation of the Constitution’s original meaning beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence (or whatever 
standard is settled on).  But this brings up the other problem—again, it may 
be that the original meaning of the judicial power incorporated a different 
concept or use of stare decisis. 
Moving further away from rejecting stare decisis on the continuum is 
the position put forth by Caleb Nelson that analogizes it to Chevron 
 
 50  Id. at 168. 
 51  Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
105, 105 (2015). 
 52  Id. 
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analysis.53  Imagine a range of reasonable meanings—as long as a previous 
court’s interpretation was within that range, it is entitled to stare decisis 
effect, even if the current court would have chosen a different meaning 
because they think it is more accurate.  But outside that zone of 
ambiguity—where precedent is “demonstrably erroneous”54—stare decisis 
is given no effect.  This approach avoids some of the prudential concerns 
that afflict positions closer to the rejection of stare decisis, but may or may 
not be correct as an original matter. 
Nelson notes a difference at the Founding between “arbitrary 
discretion”—a concern of Hamilton’s in Federalist No. 78 that thus 
weighed in favor of precedent constraining judges55—and what John 
Marshall called “mere legal discretion”: the “duty” of judges to “draw upon 
known principles of interpretation to figure out ‘the sound construction of 
the act.’”56  This “mere legal discretion” or “duty” was often how those of 
the Founding period referred to interpreting written texts, with Nelson 
observing that “antebellum lawyers frequently spoke as if courts exercised 
no will of their own.”57  Of course, as James Madison and others noted, 
“[w]ritten laws . . . have a range of indeterminacy.”58  In order to provide 
“the certainty and predictability necessary for the good of society”—
something not possible “if each judge always remained free to adopt his 
own ‘individual interpretation’ of the inevitable ambiguities in written 
laws”59—Madison believed that the ambiguous provisions of written laws 
could have the meaning settled via “a regular course of practice,” whether 
by the judiciary or other government actors such as the President.60 
But the ability of others to fix the meaning of written law was not 
without limits: Madison distinguished between “whether precedents could 
expound a Constitution” and “whether precedents could alter a 
Constitution.”61  Thus, if early interpreters had consistently given a 
particular meaning to the Constitution, it “might itself be evidence that the 
 
 53  Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (2001). 
 54  Id. at 1. 
 55  Id. at 9 (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999)). 
 56  Id. at 10 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824)). 
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 11; see The Federalist No. 37, at 196–97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1999).  
 59  Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184 (Phil., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1865)). 
 60  Id. at 12 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 
3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 59, at 143, 145). 
 61  Id. at 13 (quoting Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 4 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 59, at 204, 211). 
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construction was permissible.  But if, after giving precedents the benefit of 
the doubt, subsequent interpreters remained convinced that a prior 
construction went beyond the range of indeterminacy, they did not have to 
treat it as a valid gloss on the law.”62  Hence, while “[t]here might be a 
presumption that past interpretations were permissible . . . once this 
presumption was overcome and the court concluded that a past 
interpretation was erroneous, there was no presumption against correcting 
it.”63 
One can also adopt an identical position to Nelson’s, but add that stare 
decisis still holds even where precedent is “demonstrably erroneous”64 
when there are sufficient reliance interests.65  Nelson sees the historical 
evidence as supporting his theory, though he notes some cases that inject 
reliance interests based on property rights.66 
Finally, the last middle position is very close to the stare decisis-
always-trumps position and tends to be the most accepted modern view.67  
It presumes precedent should be upheld and requires that “a decision to 
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a 
prior case was wrongly decided.”68  This view thus does not always allow 
for stare decisis to overcome the Constitution’s text, but enables it do so 
more often than any other view outside of the most extreme pro–stare 
decisis one.  This view does not flunk the Plessy test, but arguably makes 
the Constitution’s text and original meaning rather impotent creatures. 
  
 
 62  Id. at 14. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 15.  
 65  Though that just shifts the analysis to identifying sufficient reliance interests, 
which will do most of the work under this formulation.  And given the arguably substantial 
reliance interests throughout the South during segregation, would this flunk the Plessy test?  
Some may argue that, while substantial, such reliance interests are not legitimate, but that 
just raises the question whether or not their constitutionality determines their legitimacy. 
 66  Id. at 14–21. 
 67  See, e.g., Charles Fried, Commentary, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1140, 1142–43 (1994); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991); Deborah Hellman, The 
Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1120 n.75 (1995); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756–63 
(1988); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of 
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274 (2005). 
 68  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (joint opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
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These various scholars’ positions can arguably be plotted on a 
continuum of stare decisis strength.  While the polar views are easy to 
place, one could argue over the order of the middle positions. 
TABLE 1.  SCHOLARS BY STRENGTH OF STARE DECISIS 
 
II.     HISTORICAL POSSIBILITIES AND PITFALLS 
In the quest to determine the degree to which stare decisis was 
originally incorporated into the Constitution’s judicial power, one of four 
historical scenarios is possible.  First, whatever form of stare decisis existed 
at the Founding, adopting a written constitution, and especially our 
Constitution, completely undermined the doctrine of stare decisis and made 
it incompatible with our constitutional system, as Lawson and Paulsen 
argue.  This is possible, though it would seem to require “[t]he judicial 
Power” to be doing some heavy lifting since it’s not clear the Supremacy 
Clause (and even the Oath Clause, in addition) gets one there.  After all, if 
prior to the Constitution, statutes would have been the supreme law of the 
land and stare decisis still existed under that regime, making something 
supreme to statutes does not logically throw out stare decisis.69  And when 
the Court is deciding whether its current views should trump or give way to 
the Court’s past views, again it is not really pitting the Constitution against 
precedent, but its current interpretation of the Constitution against a 
previous interpretation of precedent.  This Essay has been entirely focused 
on horizontal stare decisis—a court being bound by itself—rather than 
vertical stare decisis—which is where a higher court’s ruling binds a lower 
court.  It seems an even harder argument to make that the adoption of the 
Constitution, especially given Article VI, also obliterated stare decisis in its 
vertical form such that lower federal courts are not bound by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
A second option is that the adoption of the Constitution did not negate 
stare decisis, but weakened whatever form existed at the Founding.  This is 
more plausible than the obliteration argument, but still requires “[t]he 
judicial Power” to be doing some, if not most, of the work. 
 
 69  However, if statutes were not as systematically superior, or only superior to a slight 
degree, then adding a constitution to the hierarchy may be different enough to always trump 
stare decisis. 
2016] S T A R E  D E C I S I S  A N D  O R I G I N A L  M E A N I N G  127 
A third option is that adopting our Constitution had no effect on the 
doctrine of stare decisis as it existed at the Founding.  This is possible, at 
least with respect to horizontal stare decisis, if the Supremacy Clause 
functionally existed in the pre–Founding Era in the relationship between 
statutes and precedent, if the Oath Clause incorporates the notion that 
following what the courts say the Constitution means is seen as upholding 
the Constitution, and if “[t]he judicial Power” ensconced in Article III is 
seen as no different than the judicial power exercised before the 
Constitution.  This is possible, but it also seems intuitively problematic to 
argue that the adoption of the first written constitution affected no change 
on the judiciary, and that all of the other clauses did not modify “[t]he 
judicial Power” in some way. 
A fourth and final option is that adopting the Constitution actually 
strengthened stare decisis, possibly because of the increased supremacy of 
the Constitution layered on the existing practice of courts saying what the 
law is.  This seems like a hard argument to make, though, at least as to 
horizontal stare decisis.  It is a stronger argument when dealing with 
vertical stare decisis, given Article VI. 
There are a few difficulties in originalist research on the role of stare 
decisis in “[t]he judicial Power” in light of other constitutional clauses.  
First, when looking at what courts did prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution, one can only look at when early American courts were 
interpreting statutes, not the common law, reducing the number of 
observations.  Second, one has to determine whether the Framing 
generation viewed judicial interpretation of statutes as categorically 
different from interpreting a constitution.  And third, it takes a while for 
precedent to accrue that might create a robust system of stare decisis, and 
in the decade or two after the Founding there may not have been many 
instances of a clash between the Constitution and judicial precedent—and 
once we get past those first two decades, the value of judicial practice loses 
significant weight for originalist scholarship. 
In the end, the question of the relationship between stare decisis and 
the Constitution’s original meaning is not a theoretical one—it’s an 
empirical one.  To be answered one must sift through the historical data, 
however difficult.  After all, isn’t that originalism’s point? 
 
